Our Condition is More One of Powerlessness, Than of Power…

One particular paragraph struck a chord in us, as we embarked on the reading of the Overview of the Report of the West Indian Commission- Time for Action. It goes:

“The fact of us being a Community of Sovereign states must  not detract from our need to be a ‘community’ first and foremost – for it is the reality of community that enlarges our prospect as sovereign states. Keeping a sense of community to the fore calls for more than structures of unity. It will avail us nothing to gear up for the world of market economies and liberal democracy and simultaneously gear down by clinging to old habits of self-centredness. There is no magic in the symbols of ‘community’; they must be reflected in our way of life”  (West Indian Commission, 1992).

Even though the West Indian  Commission was completed and reported since 1992, it is simply amazing how well it speaks to the issues affecting the region; how poignantly it points out the problems that needs to be fixed fix, as well as how applicable and sensible some of its recommendations still are. However, something about it is rather troubling.

The West Indian Commission emerged from a challenge to the region’s Heads of  Governments (HoGs) in 1989 to act quickly in order to prevent the region from being left behind in the “main current of human advance in the 21st century” (Payne and Sutton, 2007). The commission, led by Sir Shridath Ramphal, was charged with the responsibility of coming up with some strategic options for CARICOM countries as they forge ahead in the post cold-war era, and prepare for the challenges of the neo-liberal 21st century.

The report of the commission was well received, and in-fact, received rave reviews from many. One critic said, "the report was a literal source of wisdom on everything under the sun; from currency to culture; from science to human rights; from exports to cricket; from CARICOM to gender issues” (Brewster, 1993:29). For shortened version see here.

However, we can’t help but get this nagging feeling that in especially one of their recommendations, those charged with the responsibility of conducting the Commission were somewhat overly concerned and careful not to step on any toes. Either this was the case, or they were too trusting of regional heads.

In this post, we shall examine one of the recommendations made by the Commission to HoGs, to deal with the problem of the implementation deficit in the region.

The Commission noted that “we face a highly demanding challenge to imagination and creativity in making regional integration a more effective vehicle for the realization of the hopes and ambitions of our people” (Overview, 1992:25). This challenge being spoken of by the Commission relates to the regions crippling implementation deficit. The recommendation made by the Commission, which they believed was the answer to this perennial problem which characterized the region then, and is plaguing is now, is the setting up of a CARICOM Commission. They believed that we needed this ” central authority, freed of national, domestic responsibilities  and allegiances, and appropriately empowered to implement CARICOM’s decisions” (Overview, 1992: 25). However, the proposition of what this central authority should be and how it should operate was, in my opinion, incredibly weak to the point where it was impracticable and naive. It could not have possibly achieved what the Commission had meant for it to achieve.

Why do we say this?  The Commission proposed that this permanent CARICOM Commission be set up, and given executive authority to implement CARICOM decisions.  This was in recognition of  the need “to device a machinery by which CARICOM decisions can be translated into action with a minimum of delay” (Overview, 1992: 28). However, the Commission went on to say that their proposed CARICOM Commission “cannot over-ride national action”.  In fact, the Commission explicitly stated that “we do not go for a radical restructuring of political organisation in the region…”, which is enough to lead one to conclude that the recommendation lacked innovation, and was in fact more of a capitulation.

Some called this proposition radical, but we cannot agree, especially when the nature and description of the proposition came from the horse’s mouth. And the horse spoke clearly in stating that  “we do not go for radical restructuring”. In fact, the recommendation was contradictory in nature.  The Commission knew what needed to be achieved, but grossly watered-down the process for achieving it.  For example, it identified “a need for a central authority, freed of national, domestic responsibilities and allegiances, and appropriately empowered to implement CARICOM’s decisions” (Over-view, 1992: 26). Yet the Commission said of the CARICOM Commission :

“the instrument of Implementation will be declaratory, not statutory. It will enunciate the decision in terms that are operational; but it will not itself have the force of law” (Overview, 1992:29).

The Commission felt satisfied, or felt it was necessary to restrict their recommendation to a solution which left the operationality of their proposed CARICOM Commission up to the whims and fancy of each  Head of Government of the region.  And they said it:

This system will require, of course, the goodwill of Member States. If we do not create a governmental apparatus at the centre, with power to over-ride national action- and we are not proposing this-we must proceed on a consensual basis, and that must imply that member states will respect and cooperate in giving fulfilment to decisions taken in CARICOM by due process” (Overview, 1992: 29)

This is where we believe they went wrong. This is where we felt the Commission lost a great opportunity to lead regional integration unto a path of efficient operationality. A historical analysis might reveal that the Commission was somewhat afflicted with the drunk obsession, with the false notion of sovereignty, which characterised the Heads of Governments who mandated them to carry out their work. Either this or they were concerned about stepping on toes.  It is plain to see from the overview.

What can also be surmised is that they were then being contradictory in their own report, for the Commission itself dubbed the idea of sovereignty within the region as being nothing short of mythical, yet in their proposal they sought to hold onto it... quiet strange.

Karen E Bravo, Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law,  wrote a very interesting paper titled: CARICOM, the Myth of Sovereignty and  Aspirational Economic Integration. It makes for excellent analysis of why we are in the situation we are in.

To be fair to the HoGs, they felt they had to cater to their national and domestic responsibilities and allegiances, and probably thought they needed room to do so. They therefore felt they could not be bound to adhere to any policy counter to their aspirations even for the sake of regional integration. The recommendation of the Commission-the CARICOM Commission-would have ensured that they would not have to, even though it spoke out against self-centredness.

The commission therefore made an error; the challenge they spoke of was not to “creativity and imagination”, it was to discipline, dedication, sacrifice and humility on the part of regional Heads of Government. There can be no creativity and imagination in dealing with political leaders unwilling to cede political power even to a watered-down version of a regional executive authority. They wanted to remain supreme decision-making authorities for their tiny pieces of rock. It is tempting to think the Commission was sympathetic to their cause.

Surprisingly, HoGs discarded with the recommendation for a permanent CARICOM Commission, and proposed something that was even  more pathetic, but speedier on the journey to failure.  And fail it did, including every other subsequent policy put in place by CARICOM Heads to correct the implementation deficit:

• The Heads rejected the CARICOM Commission in preference for a CARICOM-quasi Cabinet with allocation of portfolio responsibilities among the different Heads of Government together with a Bureau of Heads to facilitate implementation (IIR, 2011). This fell flat on its face.
• In 2003 (yes, it took them that long to do decide that an alternative mechanism to correct the implementation deficit was necessary),  with the Rose Hall Declaration, the HoGs agreed in PRINCIPLE that CARICOM decisions should have legal effect in member states and a permanent Commission should be set up to oversee implementation of CARICOM decisions.  However, up until 2010, the HoGs were yet to agree on the implementation of the Commission (IIR, 2011: 13).
• In 2010, there was an establishment of a Committee of Ambassadors to facilitate implementation of Community decisions. This Committee was seen as nothing more than a band-aid, and many were at a loss in terms of how it would function and, at best, how it could possibly serve the region. Read more here.

More disappointing is that up to this point,  some still think the CARICOM Commission with its executive authority is still the answer. We beg to disagree. Taken in its current state of the 1992 recommendation, it still shows an obsession with sovereignty and would fail. Why? The Commission was at best bereft of the ability to force member states action toward implementation of the CSME. The Commission did nothing more than propose an organisation lacking in supranantional scope and today, we are still buying into it. We are still missing the point; still fooling ourselves.

We need to avoid anything resembling the CARICOM Commission, especially since history has taught us, in the words of Louis Henkins, “sovereignty does not encourage cooperation, it breeds going at it alone”. The last thing we need is another organisation which encourages the “pooling”, but not “ceding” of sovereignty. This will get us nowhere.

What we need in this region is exactly what the West Indian Commission was avoiding, and exactly what HoGs do not wish to entertain, let alone sign unto. Clearly, their unwillingness to relinquish an amount of sovereignty necessary to cement the regional integration process has held the region back, and no amount of grand speeches, poignant rhetoric, fancy and complicated proposals (laden with big words) will get us anywhere. What we need is a supranational organ.

We do agree that Rome was not built in a day and we empathise with those who are quick to defend regional integration, and who love to point out the fact that “slowly but surely” we are heading somewhere.  What we think is ludicrous however, is for us to reinvent the wheel.  Rome took many years to build, but all we have to do to build our own Rome in less than half the time, is to borrow the blue print, and see what we can use from it.

The European Union is the paradigm of successful regional integration. According to Bravo, an analysis of the European integration project indicates that some of the minimum requirements for the achievement of economic integration among sovereign states include:

1. limited opt-out opportunities on the part of member states;
2. the direct effect of supremacy of measures intended to cause economic integration, as well as limited time and enforcement periods for implementation;
3. independent supranational body that drives policies and enforces economic integration;
4. a legitimate dispute settlement mechanism with enforcement powers;
5. a strategic planning/decision-making mechanism that defies deadlock

An analysis of CARICOM will demonstrate that these are the very ingredients we lack. The Caribbean Court of Justice might be serving as our legitimate dispute settlement body, but its existence is being threatened by member states, the majority of whom have not ratified and continue to undermine its purpose. For example, the Jamaican government suggesting the creation of Jamaica’s own Final Court of Appeal will do nothing but contribute to the further fragmentation of the region.

We are in no way stating that we should adopt in a wholesale manner the blue print of the European Union, but it would be to our benefit to see what we can utilise from it and what lessons we can learn. We would encourage HoGs to commission an in depth analysis of the European Union’s history, construct, nature and character, and see what lessons we can learn, and what methods we can adopt to expedite and make effective our own regionalism, of course, fitting into our own unique context.

However, we urge the immediate establishment of a supranational body, as this is critical for any forward movement within the region. We need to build the home while we occupy it, and the foundation is a supranational organ to ensure that the work is done timely, and that all workers conform to the building code and stay true to the blue-print.


Courtney Lindsay
On behalf of the CMCE